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Abstract
Agglomeration brings costs (e.g., intensied local competition) as
well as benets (e.g., knowledge spillover). It is important to examine
the net impact of agglomeration to understand the geographic dis-
tribution of economic activities. In this study, we use rm markup
(dened as the ratio of price over marginal cost) to capture the net
impact of agglomeration. Using data from Chinese manufacturing
rms in the 1998-2005 period, we rst recover the markup ratio for
each rm following De Locker and Warzynski (2012), and then use
changes in industrial a¢ liation as a quasi-experiment to identify the
impact of agglomeration on rm markup. Our di¤erence-in-di¤erences
(DID) estimation shows that agglomeration has a negative impact on
rm markup, suggesting that the devastating competition e¤ect dom-
inates the benecial spillover e¤ect in Chinese context. Moreover, we
nd that the impact of agglomeration on rm markup varies across
di¤erent industries and types of rms.
Keywords: Agglomeration; Firm Markup; Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences
Estimation; Spillover e¤ect; Competition e¤ect
JEL Codes: R11; L25; D22
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1 Introduction
The geographic concentration of economic activities has been widely docu-
mented across countries and industries, for example, the manufacturing belt
in the United States, the blue banana belt in the European Union, and the
Pacic coast industrial belt in Japan.1 Although agglomeration brings about
substantial positive spillover,2 it also leads to greater competition3 and, con-
sequently, lower prices (e.g., Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse, 2002; Melitz
and Ottaviano, 2008).4 An important yet overlooked question concerns the
net e¤ect of agglomeration on rm performance.
In this study, we use rm markup (dened as the ratio of price over mar-
ginal cost) to investigate these two o¤setting e¤ects of agglomeration (namely,
the benecial spillover e¤ect and the devastating competition e¤ect). The
spillover e¤ect, on the one hand, is found to increase rm productivity,5
which results in lower marginal production costs and higher rm markup.
On the other hand, the competition e¤ect leads to lower market prices and
lower rm markup. Thus, rm markup allows us to capture the net e¤ect
of agglomeration on rm performance. Furthermore, by looking at various
scenarios in which the spillover e¤ect and the competition e¤ect may have
di¤erent relative importance, we can further disentangle these two competing
e¤ects of agglomeration on rm performance.
There are, however, two empirical challenges to this research goal: how
to calculate rm markup; and how to identify the causal e¤ect of agglomera-
tion on rm markup. Firm-level data rarely contain information on product
prices, let alone information on marginal costs. Additionally, more agglom-
erated industries may di¤er from less agglomerated industries in many other
dimensions, compounding the e¤ect of agglomeration. Our study is the rst
1See Holmes and Stevens (2004) for a detailed description of the spatial distribution
of economic activities in the United States and Canada; Combes and Overman (2004) for
the case of the European Union; and Fujita, Mori, Henderson, and Kanemoto (2004) for
the case of Japan and China.
2The spillover may come from, for example, labor pooling, input sharing or knowledge
spillover. For a literature review, see Rosenthal and Strange (2004).
3Comparably speaking, much less attention has been paid to the costs associated with
agglomeration. The available studies have highlighted higher wages, higher rents and more
congestion as costs of agglomeration. These costs are mostly indirect, compared with the
impact of agglomeration on market prices.
4Recently, there are two studies showing that market competition may increase prices
under some conditions, i.e., Chen and Riordan (2008); Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and
Thisse (2011).
5For a review, see Melo, Graham, and Noland (2009). We also nd evidence for the
positive impact of agglomeration on rm productivity in the case of Chinas manufacturing
industries in the 1998-2005 period (see Table A1 for details).
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to use rm markup to capture the net e¤ect of agglomeration. We also
contribute to the literature by carefully addressing the two empirical issues
mentioned above.
Specically, following the recent work by De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012), we rst recover the markup ratio for each rm using standard rm-
level nancial information such as output, capital, labor and materials. Next,
as a quasi-experiment to identify the causal e¤ect of agglomeration on rm
markup, we explore a scenario in which some rms change their industrial af-
liations. Our identication strategy relies on the comparison of the markup
values of rms that changed their industrial a¢ liations (the treatment group)
with the markup values of rms that did not change their industrial af-
liations (the control group) before and after the year of change, i.e., the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) estimation.
The data for our study come from annual surveys of manufacturing rms
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the 1998-2005
period. Our DID estimation nds that agglomeration has a negative and
statistically signicant e¤ect on rm markup, implying that overall in China
the direct costs of agglomeration caused by enhanced competition outweigh
the benets of agglomeration. To ensure the validity of our DID estimation,
we conduct the following series of robustness checks on the identication
assumption of the DID estimation and other estimation concerns:
 Check whether the treatment and control groups have di¤erential time
trends in the pre-treatment period
 Allow rms in the treatment and control groups to follow di¤erent time
trends
 Include more rm-level controls to check whether the treatment and
control groups are balanced
 Use an outcome variable that is not supposed to be a¤ected by the
change in industrial a¢ liation as a placebo test
 Measure Ellison-Glaesers industrial agglomeration index at three dif-
ferent geographic scopes (i.e., province, city, or county), as a check on
the sensitivity of the index to geographic scopes (the so-called modi-
able area unit problem, see Arbia, 2001)
 Exclude rms with extreme markup ratios, to address the concern that
our results could be driven by a few outlying observations
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 Examine the one-shot e¤ect of the change in industrial a¢ liation to
rule out the concern that our DID estimator may capture the e¤ect of
other events happening later in the post-treatment period
 Dene the change of industrial a¢ liation at the two-digit industry level
to address the concerns about the misreporting of industrial a¢ liation
 Control for the omitted price bias in the estimation of the production
function by following Klette and Griliches (1996)s method
 Incorporate the role of agglomeration into the estimation of the pro-
duction function
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we investigate the di¤eren-
tial e¤ects of agglomeration on rm markup across di¤erent industries and
types of rms, which allows us to disentangle the two o¤setting e¤ects of
agglomeration.
First, despite three decades of economic reform in China, the state still
plays an important and dominant role in the economy. State-owned enter-
prises, protected by the central and local governments, enjoy various favor-
able policies and are shielded from local competition. As a result, agglomer-
ation is expected to have a less damaging impact on markup for state-owned
enterprises than on markup for non-state-owned enterprises. Indeed, we nd
that the impact of agglomeration on markup is statistically insignicant for
state-owned enterprises, whereas it is negative and signicant for non-state-
owned enterprises.
Second, given the established production technologies and stagnant mar-
ket demand in mature industries, as compared to fast-growing industries,
the devastating competition e¤ect vis-à-vis the benecial spillover e¤ect is
expected to be more prominent and, consequently, the negative net impact of
agglomeration more pronounced in the former industries than in the latter.
Following the classication method of Henderson et al. (1995), we divide
industries into mature industries and fast-growing industries. As expected,
the impact of agglomeration on markup is negative and signicant for mature
industries, but is insignicant for fast-growing industries.
Third, for industries producing goods for nationally integrated markets,
the negative competition e¤ect of agglomeration is muted, although the posi-
tive spillover e¤ect remains intact, implying a less negative or even a positive
impact of agglomeration on rm markup. Following the denition of Rauch
(1999), we divide industries into those with goods traded at exchanges, those
with reference-prices, and other industries. It is found that the impact of ag-
glomeration on markup is positive and signicant for industries with goods
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traded at exchanges, but remains negative and signicant for the other two
types of industries.
Our study is related to an emerging literature on rm markup. Studies
along this line include those on markup estimation methodologies (Roeger,
1995; Klette, 1999; De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012), and various factors af-
fecting markup ratios such as anti-trust policy (Warzynski, 2001), trade pol-
icy (Konings and Vandenbussche, 2005), privatization and competition (Kon-
ings, Cayseele, and Warzynski, 2005), and exporting behavior (De Loecker
and Warzynski, 2012).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the estimation method of rm markup, and our strategy for identifying the
e¤ect of agglomeration. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Empirical
results regarding the e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup are reported in
Section 4. The paper concludes with Section 5.
2 A Brief Discussion of Theories of Agglom-
eration and Firm Markup
Current theories of trade and urban economics o¤er very limited analysis of
how agglomeration a¤ects rm markup. Previous researchers have examined
the e¤ect of agglomeration on product prices, but they generally assume that
rm productivity (and hence marginal production costs) is constant. As a
result, the e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup mostly comes from the
price channel. In this section, we briey discuss two leading models of this
literature, and investigate how agglomeration a¤ects rm markup when rm
productivity is positively a¤ected by agglomeration.
Krugman (1979, 1980) uses the monopolistic competition model devel-
oped by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to examine the pattern of agglomeration.
This has been the most inuential model in the trade and urban literature.
This model was later modied by Melitz (2003) to incorporate rm hetero-
geneity, that is, rms with di¤erent productivity levels. The core element
of Krugmans model is that the preference of the representative consumer is
characterized by the CES utility function, and market competition is modeled
as monopolistic competition. As a result, each rm produces a unique vari-
ety and charges a constant markup, a natural consequence of which is that
agglomeration does not have any e¤ect on each individual rms markup.
Though neither Krugman (1979) nor Melitz (2003) considers the possibil-
ity that agglomeration increases rm productivity, incorporating this fact
does not change the result; agglomeration still does not a¤ect rm markup.
5
Specically, agglomeration lowers both rm productivity and price, but these
two e¤ects cancel each other out so that on balance rm markup does not
change.
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisses (2002) alternative model addresses the
unsatisfactory feature of constant markup. In their model, the preference
of the representative consumer is modeled as a quasi-linear utility with a
quadratic subutility. Given the assumption of constant rm productivity,
the model generates the result that agglomeration lowers rm price and fur-
ther lowers rm markup. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) revise the model of
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) by allowing rms to have di¤erent
productivity levels. However, as productivity is assumed to be exogenous to
agglomeration, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also nd that rm markup is
unambiguously lower in more agglomerated regions. Recently, Zhao (2011)
builds upon Melitz and Ottavianos (2008) framework by assuming rm pro-
ductivity to be a monotonic and positive function of agglomeration. Hence,
it is not clear whether agglomeration has a positive or negative e¤ect on
rm markup, as agglomeration increases rm productivity (and then lowers
marginal cost) but also lowers rm price. The numerical results in Zhao
(2011) suggest agglomeration is more likely to have a negative e¤ect on rm
markup.
3 Estimation Methodologies
In this section, we discuss the method for estimating rmmarkup, and the es-
timation strategy for identifying the e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup.
3.1 Estimation of Firm Markup
To recover rm-level markup, we follow the recent work of De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012). Specically, we assume that rm i at time t has the
following production technology6
Qit = Fit (Lit; Kit;Mit; !it) ; (1)
where Lit, Kit, and Mit are the inputs of labor, capital, and intermediate
materials, respectively; !it denotes rm-specic productivity. The produc-
tion function F (:) is assumed to be continuous and twice-di¤erentiable with
respect to all of its arguments.
6Note that the framework is robust to any arbitrary number of inputs. As we only
observe three inputs (i.e., labor, capital, and intermediate materials) in our data, here we
focus on a production technology involving only these three inputs.
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Consider the following cost minimization problem faced by rm i at time
t7
min
fLit;Kit;Mitg
witLit + ritKit + p
m
itMit (2)
s:t: Fit (Lit; Kit;Mit; !it)  Qit;
where wit, rit, and pmit denote the wage rate, rental price of capital, and
the price of intermediate inputs, respectively; and Qit is a given number of
output.
The estimation of rm-level markup hinges upon the choice of an input
that is free of any adjustment costs, and the estimation of its output elasticity.
As labor is largely not freely chosen in China (particularly for state-owned
enterprises) and capital is often considered a dynamic input (as a result of
which its output elasticity is di¢ cult to interpret), we choose intermediate
materials as the input to estimate rm markup (see also De Loecker and
Warzynski, 2012). Specically, the Lagrangian function associated with the
optimization problem (2) can be written as
L (Lit; Kit;Mit; it; it) = witLit + ritKit + pmitMit
+it [Qit   Fit (Lit; Kit;Mit; !it)] : (3)
Hence, the rst-order-condition for intermediate materials is
@L
@Mit
= pmit   it
@Fit
@Mit
= 0: (4)
Re-arranging equation (4) and multiplying both sides by Mit
Qit
yield
@Fit
@Mit
Mit
Qit
=
1
it
pmitMit
Qit
=
Pit
it
pmitMit
PitQit
; (5)
where Pit is the price of the nal good.
Note that it = @L@Qit = mcit represents the marginal cost of production
at a given level of output, and dene rm markup it as the ratio of price
over marginal cost, i.e., it  Pitmcit = Pitit . Hence, equation (5) leads to the
following estimation expression of rm markup
it = 
m
it (
m
it )
 1 ; (6)
7De Locker and Frederic (2012) discuss some alternative settings of market competition,
which lead to a similar estimation expression for rm markup. These alternative settings
include Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, and monopolistic competition.
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where mit  @Fit@Mit MitQit is the output elasticity of intermediate materials and
mit  p
m
itMit
PitQit
is the share of the expenditure of intermediate materials in total
revenue.
As the information about the expenditure on intermediate materials and
total revenue is available in the data, mit can be readily calculated. How-
ever, the output elasticity of intermediate materials, mit ; needs to be obtained
through the estimation of the production function (1). There is a large lit-
erature on the estimation of the production function focusing on how to
control for unobserved productivity shocks (see Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry,
and Pakes, 2007, for a review). The solutions range from the instrumental
variable estimation, to the GMM estimation, and to the control function ap-
proach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). We adopt the control function
approach developed by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazier (2006), which com-
prises a two-steps estimation.8
The production function to be estimated is expressed as
qit = llit + kkit + mmit + !it + "it; (7)
where the lower case letters represent the logarithm of the upper case letters;
= (l; k; m) is the vector of the production function coe¢ cients, or the
output elasticities; !it is the total factor productivity (TFP); and "it is an
i.i.d. error term. In Appendix A, we lay out the details of the procedure for
estimating the production function.
We estimate the translog production function (7) separately for each two-
digit industry. After we recover the coe¢ cient of the intermediate materials in
the production function ^m, rm markup can be calculated based on equation
(6), i.e.,
^it = ^m (^
m
it )
 1 ; (8)
where ^mit = p
m
itMit= (PitQit=exp ("^it)).
Several caveats are worth noting. First, the above framework implicitly
assumes a single-product rm. In reality, however, rms may produce a range
of products. In the absence of detailed information on the amounts of inputs
used for each product, the markup calculated in equation (8) should be inter-
preted as the average markup across all products for a rm. The existence of
multi-product rms should not, in any case, a¤ect our identication strategy
for the e¤ect of agglomeration on markup because our identication utilizes
the variations in markup over time for the same rm.
8Our results obtained using the Olley and Pakes (2006)s method are qualitatively the
same.
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Second, the estimation of the production function requires an observation
of the quantity of rm-level output. Unfortunately, such information is not
available in most of the rm-level data sets, including ours. As a compromise,
the quantity-based output is recovered by deating the observed revenue with
the industry-level price index, which is subject to the omitted price bias as
pointed out by Klette and Griliches (1996). However, this may not be a
concern in the context of our study. The omitted price bias a¤ects the level
of the estimated markup, whereas our identication relies on the di¤erences
in the estimated markup across time and across rms (see De Loecker and
Warzynski, 2012, for more discussion on this point). Nonetheless, in a robust-
ness check, we follow Klette and Griliches (1996) to control for this potential
omitted price bias in the estimation of the production function.
Third, it is widely documented that agglomeration positively a¤ects rm
productivity, and consequently the estimation of the production function. To
address this concern, in a robustness check we revise the estimation procedure
of the production function by explicitly incorporating the role of agglomera-
tion. See Appendix B for details of the revised estimation procedure.
3.2 Identication of the E¤ect of Agglomeration on
Firm Markup
To illustrate our identication strategy for the e¤ect of agglomeration on
rm markup, we adopt the Rubin causal model. Assume that for rm i of
industry j at time t, we can observe two potential outcomes, Y ji;t(EG
j
t = A)
and Y ji;t(EG
j
t = B), where Y
j
i;t represents the outcome variables such as the
logarithm of price, the logarithm of marginal cost, and the logarithm of
markup; EGjt is a measure of the degree of agglomeration (namely EG index,
following Ellison and Glaeser (1997); see the next section for details); and
without loss of generality, it is assumed that A > B.
The e¤ect of agglomeration can be then calculated as
i;t = E

Y ji;t(EG
j
t = A)  Y ji;t(EGjt = B)

; (9)
where  = c when the outcome variable is the logarithm of marginal cost;
 = P when the outcome variable is the logarithm of price; and  =  when
the outcome variable is the logarithm of markup. In the baseline analysis,
we estimate the average treatment e¤ect, that is, i;t = 
. While in the
second part of the empirical analysis, we allow the treatment e¤ect to vary
across di¤erent industries and di¤erent types of rms.
It is expected that c < 0, implying that rms have lower marginal costs
in more agglomerated areas (that is, the positive spillover e¤ect). It is also
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generally expected that P < 0, implying that agglomeration generally re-
duces rm prices (that is, the negative competition e¤ect). And   P c
captures the net of these two e¤ects of agglomeration (spillover versus com-
petition e¤ects). Specically, if  > 0, we have 0 > P > c, which implies
that the spillover e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect. And if  < 0, we
have the opposite nding, that is, the competition e¤ect is larger than the
spillover e¤ect.
However, in observational data like ours, we are only able to observe one of
the two potential outcome values, that is, either Y ji;t(EG
j
t = A) or Y
j
i;t(EG
j
t =
B). This makes the calculation described in equation (9) unfeasible. To
retrieve the e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup (i.e., ), we exploit a
quasi-natural experiment, that is, we use a sample of rms that changed their
industrial a¢ liation during the sample period, to conduct a DID analysis.
Specically, assume that a treatment rm i changed its industrial a¢ lia-
tion from industry j0 to industry j at time ti0. The control rm is a rm from
the same prior industry j0 (and with several similar rm characteristics) that
did not change industrial a¢ liation. The indicator of the treatment status
Treatmenti is denoted as
Treatmenti =

1 if rm i is in the treatment group
0 if rm i is in the control group
: (10)
Our DID estimator is
DID = E
h
Y ji;ti0(EG
j
ti0 = A)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1(EG
j0
ti0 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 1i
 E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1(EG
j0
ti0 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 0i
= E

Y ji;ti0(EG
j
ti0 = A)  Y ji;ti0(EGjti0 = B)
Treatmenti = 1
+E
h
Y ji;ti0(EG
j
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)
Treatmenti = 1i
+
0@ E hY j0i;ti0(EGj0ti0 = B)  Y j0i;ti0 1(EGj0ti0 1 = C)Treatmenti = 1i
 E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1(EG
j0
ti0 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 0i
1A
=  + IA1 + IA2; (11)
where
IA1 = E
h
Y ji;ti0(EG
j
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)
Treatmenti = 1i (12)
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IA2 = E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1(EG
j0
ti0 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 1i
 E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1(EG
j0
ti0 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 0i
(13)
There are two identication assumptions in our DID estimation. The rst
identication assumption, (12), reects the potential e¤ect due to the change
of industrial a¢ liation but without the change in the degree of agglomeration.
The second identication assumption, (13), requires the treatment group to
have followed the trend of the control group in markup changes, if they had
not changed industrial a¢ liation. As long as our identication assumptions
are satised (i.e., IA1 = 0 and IA2 = 0), our DID estimator recovers the
true e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup, i.e., DID = 
.9
In regression form, the DID estimation has the following specication
lnjit =   Treatmenti  Postit +   EGjt  Postit
+i + t + "
j
it; (14)
where t is the time dummy, capturing those factors common to all rms at
time t; i is the rm dummy, capturing rm is all time-invariant character-
istics; Postit indicates the post-treatment period for rm i and is dened as
follows
Postit =

1 8t  ti0
0 otherwise
; (15)
and "jit is the error term.  is our key interest, representing the e¤ect of
agglomeration on rm markup. To deal with the potential heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation, we cluster the standard errors at the rm level following
Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004).
Note that the inclusion of TreatmentiPostit controls for the identica-
tion assumption (12), that is, any e¤ects due to the change in the industrial
a¢ liation, beyond the change in the degree of agglomeration. In other words,
whether the estimated coe¢ cient ~ from equation (14) captures the true ef-
fect  only hinges upon the satisfaction of the identication assumption
(13), i.e., ~ =  + IA2 and IA2 = 0) ~ = .
Below, we discuss a few estimation issues, especially the checks on the
identication assumption (13).
9In the matching stage, we nd that rm markup is not correlated with the probability
of changing industrial a¢ liation, i.e., there is no selection on the outcome variable.
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First, to improve the comparability between the treatment and control
groups, we construct a matched control group, that is, una¤ected rms (i.e.,
those without changes in their industrial a¢ liation) in the same prior treat-
ment industry and with similar rm characteristics. Specically, we rst esti-
mate the probability of changing industrial a¢ liation based on rm markup,
size, age, productivity, ownership structure, and industry and year dummies.
The matched control rm is the rm with the closest predicted probability
as that of the focus treatment rm.
Second, the change in industrial a¢ liation is dened at the three-digit
industry level. To relieve the concern of misreporting industrial a¢ liation,
we restrict the selection to permanent changers, that is, we exclude those
rms that changed industrial a¢ liation many times in the sample period. As
a further check on the potential misreporting issue, we repeat the analysis
for changes dened at the two-digit industry level.
Third, one way to check whether the identication assumption (13) holds
is to examine whether the assumption is satised for several years before the
treatment happened, i.e.,
IA2s = E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0 s(EG
j0
ti0 s = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1 s(EG
j0
ti0 s 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 1i
 E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0 s(EG
j0
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1 s(EG
j0
ti0 s 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 0i
= 0 8s  1: (16)
A nding of IA2s = 08s may imply that our identication assumption (13)
also holds. The corresponding regression specication of this robustness
check is
lnjit =   Treatmenti  Postit +   EGjt  Postit
+
X
s=1
s  Treatmenti  t s + i + t + "jit; (17)
and the joint test of s = 0 implies IA2s = 08s, lending support to our
identication assumption (13).
Fourth, rms in the treatment and control groups may follow di¤erent
time trends, which may compound our DID estimator. To address this con-
cern, we allow rm-specic time trends in our DID estimation. The new
regression specication becomes
lnjit =   Treatmenti  Postit +   EGjt  Postit
+i + t + i  t+ "jit; (18)
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and our identication assumption (13) is relaxed as
IA2 = E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1(EG
j0
ti0 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 1; ii
 E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1(EG
j0
ti0 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 0; ii :
(19)
Fifth, if the treatment and control groups are balanced (and hence the
identication assumption (13) holds), the inclusion of additional rm-level
controls should not signicantly change the DID estimator. As a check, we
include a number of rm characteristics (Xit) in the DID estimation. The
new regression specication becomes
lnjit =   Treatmenti  Postit +   EGjt  Postit
+i + t +X
0
it  + "jit; (20)
and our identication assumption (13) is relaxed as
IA2 = E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1(EG
j0
ti0 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 1;Xi;ti0i
 E
h
Y j
0
i;ti0
(EGj
0
ti0 = B)  Y j
0
i;ti0 1(EG
j0
ti0 1 = C)
Treatmenti = 0;Xi;ti0i :
(21)
Sixth, as a placebo test, instead of looking at rm markup as the out-
come variable, we examine an alternative outcome variable zjit that is not
supposed to be a¤ected by the change in industrial a¢ liation. Hence, the
DID estimator of zjit is similar to equation (11), i.e., 
z
DID = 
z+IA1z+IA2z.
As z = 0 and IA1z is controlled in the regression, the estimator zDID is
reduced to as zDID = IA2
z. A nding of zDID = 0 means IA2
z = 0, which
implies the satisfaction of our identication assumption (13). For the choice
of outcome variable zjit, we use an indicator of whether a rm changed its
ownership structure, e.g., from state-owned enterprise to private enterprise.
The premise is that a change in industrial a¢ liation should not systematically
lead to a change in ownership structure.
4 Data and Variables
The data for this study comes from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing
Firms conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period
of 1998 to 2005. It is the most comprehensive rm-level data set in China.
13
The survey covers all state-owned enterprises and those non-state-owned en-
terprises with annual sales of ve million Renminbi (Chinese currency) or
more. The number of enterprises in the sample ranges from 149,556 in 1998
to 244,315 in 2005. These rms are distributed among 29 two-digit or 171
three-digit manufacturing industries, and across 31 provinces, 344 cities, and
2,829 counties.
During the sample period, there were several changes in Chinas admin-
istrative boundaries and consequently in the county or city codes in our data
set. For example, new counties were established, while existing counties were
combined into larger ones or even elevated to cities. Using the 1999 National
Standard (promulgated at the end of 1998 and called GB/T 2260-1999) as
the benchmark codes, we convert the regional codes of all the rms to these
benchmark codes to achieve consistency in the regional codes throughout the
sample period. Meanwhile, a new classication system for industry codes
(GB/T 4754-2002) was adopted in 2003 to replace the old classication sys-
tem (GB/T 4754-1994) that had been used from 1995 to 2002. To achieve
consistency in the industry codes for the whole sample period (1998-2005),
we convert the industry codes in the 2003-2005 data to the old classication
system.
Our DID analysis uses the change of industrial a¢ liation of rms over the
sample period. A total of 29,399 rms changed their three-digit industrial
a¢ liations during the sample period; they comprise our treatment group.10
There are a total of 27,050 rms in the matched control group.11 Deleting
observations missing valid information for key variables (such as output and
inputs), we end up with a nal regression sample of 214,138.
To measure the degree of agglomeration, we follow the method developed
by Ellison and Glaeser (1997), which tackles the large plant issue su¤ered
by other measures of agglomeration. Ellison and Glaesers index (henceforth
referred to as the EG index) is constructed as follows:
EGjt 
Gjt   (1 
P
r
s2rt)H
j
t
(1 P
r
s2rt)(1 Hjt )
;
where Gjt 
P
r
(sjrt   srt)2 is the spatial Gini coe¢ cient, with sjrt being the
share of regions r employment in industry j in the total countrys employ-
10Note that in constructing the treatment group, we exclude rms that changed their
industrial a¢ liations more than once over the sample period, to alleviate the concern of
misreporting.
11The number of rms in the control group is slightly below that in the treatment group
because replacement is allowed in the matching process.
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ment of this industry at year t; and srt being the share of region rs total
manufacturing employment in the countrys total at year t; and Hjt =
P
j
h2ejt
is the Herndahl index of industry j at year t, with hejt standing for the
output share of a particular rm e in industry j. The EG index, which is es-
sentially the di¤erence between the Gini coe¢ cient and the Herndahl index,
measures the degree of industrial agglomeration beyond the level implied by
the industrial structures. In the main analysis, we measure the EG index by
using the city as the geographic unit. For robustness checks, we also measure
the EG index using the county and the province as the geographic unit.
Control variables used in the analysis include: rm size (measured as
the logarithm of total employment), rm age (measured as the logarithm
of years of establishment), exporter status (a dummy variable indicating
whether a rm is an exporter or not), and foreign rm status (a dummy
variable indicating whether a rm is registered as a foreign rm).
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 lists the average markup for the 29 two-digit manufacturing indus-
tries. Generally, monopolized industries have the highest average markup
values, for example, tobacco processing (1:54), medical and pharmaceutical
products (1:47), and petroleum processing, coking products, and gas pro-
duction and supply (1:37). Industries with the lowest average markup are
garments and other ber products (1:16), leather, furs, down and related
products (1:17), and the textile industry (1:21), which have low entry barri-
ers and numerous small rms.
[Insert Table 1]
Figure 1 presents the unconditional correlation between the EG index
and average markup at the two-digit industry level. There is a clear, neg-
ative correlation between the EG index and markup, implying that overall
agglomeration has a negative impact on markup in China.
[Insert Figure 1]
5.2 Baseline Results
Our baseline DID estimation results, corresponding to equation (14), are
reported in Column 1 of Table 2. It is found that the estimated coe¢ cient of
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TreatmentiPostit is statistically insignicant and close to 0 in magnitude.
This implies that when the degree of agglomeration does not change, the
change in industrial a¢ liation does not have an e¤ect on rm markup.
[Insert Table 2]
With respect to our central issue, the estimated coe¢ cient (DID) of
EGjt  Postit is negative and highly signicant. This result implies that
the increase in the degree of agglomeration reduces rm markup, which is
consistent with Figure 1. In terms of magnitude, a one-standard-deviation
increase (i.e., 0:469) in the degree of agglomeration causes rm markup to
drop by 4:3%.
Note that in the aforementioned estimation, we include rms from all
171 three-digit manufacturing industries in the same regression and estimate
only one coe¢ cient DID. Hence, the estimated coe¢ cient 

DID represents
the average e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup in China across all indus-
tries. This implies that overall in China agglomeration has a negative e¤ect
on rm markup. In other words, in China, the devastating competition e¤ect
dominates the benecial spillover e¤ect, i.e., jcj > P . There are two pos-
sible explanations for this. First, Chinas market has been highly fragmented
due to its low economic development on the one hand and local protection-
ism on the other, which limits the degree of inter-regional competition. In
other words, market competition comes mostly from local competitors. As a
result, the competition e¤ect brought by industrial agglomeration is ercer
in China, compared with countries that have nationally integrated markets
and nationwide market competition. Second, there is limited opportunity
for rms in China to learn from competitors located nearby, because China
has specialized in low value added manufacturing industries and low value
added segments of manufacturing industries. Taken together, these factors
have led to the domination of the competition e¤ect of agglomeration over
the spillover e¤ect of agglomeration in China.
5.3 Checks on the Identication Assumption of the
DID Estimation
In this sub-section, we report a series of sensitivity checks, as discussed in
Section 2.2, on the identication assumption (13).
Pre-treatment di¤erential time trends. The rst robustness check
on the validity of our DID estimation examines whether the identication
assumption (13) holds in the pre-treatment period. Regression results ac-
cording to equation (17) are presented in Column 2 of Table 2. The insignif-
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icant joint test (F-test) of 1 and 2 gives no evidence for any di¤erential
time trends between the treatment and control groups in the two years be-
fore the treatment, lending support to our identication assumption (13).
Therefore, our main nding on the e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup
remains robust.
Firm-specic time trend. One further concern is that rms in the
treatment and control group may follow di¤erent time trends over the whole
sample period, which may then compound our ndings. To address this
concern, we allow rm-specic time trends in the DID estimation. Regression
results according to equation (18) are reported in Column 3 of Table 2.
Clearly, our main nding on the e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup
remains robust to the inclusion of rm-specic time trends, despite the fall
in the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient.
Additional controls. A corollary of the satisfaction of our identica-
tion assumption (13) is that the inclusion of additional controls in the DID
estimation should not signicantly change the DID estimate as the treat-
ment and control groups are balanced. Hence, we repeat our DID analysis
with the addition of several rm characteristics such as rm size, rm age,
productivity, foreign rm status, and exporter status. Regression results ac-
cording to equation (20) are reported in Column 4 of Table 2. It is found
that our regressor of interest, EGjt  Postit, remains negative and statisti-
cally signicant. Although the estimated coe¢ cient increases a little bit, it
is not statistically di¤erent from the corresponding number in our baseline
estimation.
Placebo test. The use of an outcome variable (z) that is not supposed
to be a¤ected by our treatment allows us to check whether our identica-
tion assumption (13) holds or not. Regression results using the indicator of
changing rm ownership structure as the dependent variable are reported in
Column 5 of Table 2. Clearly, the regressor of interest, EGjtPostit, becomes
highly insignicant and close to 0 in magnitude. This result means that our
identication assumption (13) holds, implying our baseline DID estimation
is not biased due to some underlying compounding factors.
5.4 Other Robustness Checks
In this sub-section, we report some further robustness checks on our afore-
mentioned ndings.
EG indices at alternative geographic scopes. Thus far our analy-
sis uses city as the geographic unit to measure the degree of agglomeration.
One concern is whether our ndings are sensitive to the choice of geographic
scope, or the so-called modiable area unit problem (Arbia, 2001). To ad-
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dress this concern, we repeat our analysis using both province and county as
the geographic scopes to measure the degree of agglomeration. Regression
results are reported in Columns 1-2 of Table 3. It is found that agglomera-
tion continues to cast a negative and statistically signicant impact on rm
markup, implying that our ndings are not driven by the choice of geographic
scope.
[Insert Table 3]
One-shot e¤ect. The use of multiple periods in our DID analysis raises
the concern that the DID estimator captures the variations of agglomeration
due to events that happened in the post-treatment period. To alleviate this
concern, we restrict the post-treatment period to one year after the change in
industrial a¢ liation. Regression results are reported in Column 3 of Table 3.
It is found that agglomeration still has a negative and statistically signicant
e¤ect and the magnitude is even stronger. This result implies that DID
estimate identied in Table 2 is not caused by events occurring after the
change in industrial a¢ liation.
Exclusion of outliers. Another concern is whether our ndings are
driven by some outlying observations. To address this concern, we exclude
rms whose markup values are at the top or bottom 1% of the entire sam-
ple. Regression results are reported in Column 4 of Table 3. Clearly, our
main ndings on the negative e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup re-
main robust, implying that the concern about outliers is not relevant in this
context.
Change at the two-digit industry. One possible concern is that rms
may misreport their industrial a¢ liations, which would invalidate our DID
setting. In the above analysis, we restrict our analysis to a sample of rms
that during the whole sample period either did not change their industrial
a¢ liations (the control group), or changed only once (the treatment group),
which may reduce the problem of misreporting. As a further check, we dene
the treatment group as rms that changed their industrial a¢ liations once
at the two-digit industry level; misreporting is less likely at this level than
at the three-digit industry level. Regression results are reported in Column
5 of Table 3. We still nd a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect of
agglomeration on rm markup, implying the validity of our DID setting.
Control for omitted price bias in the estimation of production
function. As our data does not have price information, we recover output in
quantity by deating output in value with the industry price index. This may
bias the estimated coe¢ cients of production function (Klette and Griliches,
1996). However, the omitted price bias should not a¤ect our DID estima-
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tion as our identication uses the double-di¤erenced instead of the level of
estimated coe¢ cients of production function. Nonetheless, we conduct a fur-
ther robustness check by using the method proposed by Klette and Griliches
(1996) to control for the omitted price issue in the estimation of production
function. Regression results are reported in Column 6 of Table 3. Consistent
with our previous ndings, agglomeration still has a negative and statisti-
cally signicant e¤ect on rm markup, implying that the omitted price bias
in the estimation of production function does not drive our ndings.
Incorporating the role of agglomeration into the estimation of
production function. As agglomeration is found to a¤ect rm produc-
tivity, it is possible that it could also a¤ect our estimation of production
function. As a robustness check, we explicitly incorporate the role of ag-
glomeration into our estimation of production function. The DID estimation
results are reported in Column 7 of Table 3. Again, our main ndings re-
main robust to the control for the role of agglomeration in the estimation of
production function.
5.5 Heterogeneous Responses
Our results thus far demonstrate a negative impact of agglomeration on rm
markup, implying that, on the whole, the devastating competition e¤ect
dominates the benecial spillover e¤ect in China. In this sub-section, we
look at several scenarios in which these two o¤setting e¤ects have di¤erent
relative importance, so that we can disentangle them.
SOEs versus non-SOEs. A unique feature of Chinas economic reform
is its gradualism, that is, the state retains dominant control of the economy
(Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999). Indeed, China still retains a signicant
amount of state ownership, despite thirty years of economic reform (CAI
JING Magazine, 2007). As the privileged children of the state, state-owned
enterprises enjoy numerous favorable policies. For example, state-owned en-
terprises have easy access to bank loans, while non-state-owned enterprises
are typically denied access to bank loans (Li, 2001). And, as sources of scal
revenue and employment, state-owned enterprises are strongly protected by
local governments and, hence, shielded from local competition. As a result,
it is expected that the devastating competition e¤ect brought by industrial
agglomeration will be smaller for state-owned enterprises than for non-state
owned enterprises. In addition, state-owned enterprises are found to bene-
t more from spillover than non-state-owned enterprises, presumably due to
heavy government investment and the resulting technical capabilities (e.g.,
Hale and Long, 2011). Taken together, it is expected that the net impact
of agglomeration on rm markup will be less negative or even positive for
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state-owned enterprises. These hypotheses are supported by our analysis.
Columns 1-2 of Table 4 show that for the sub-sample of state-owned enter-
prises, the impact of agglomeration on rm markup is statistically insigni-
cant, whereas for the sub-sample of non-state-owned enterprises, the impact
of agglomeration on rm markup is negative and signicant.
[Insert Table 4]
Mature versus fast-growing industries. In industries with fast growth
rates, rms enjoy the expansion of markets. As a result, the negative, local
competition brought by industrial agglomeration is less erce. However, in
mature industries with barely any growth, rms compete for limited num-
bers of clients, as a result of which industrial agglomeration brings stronger
local competition. Furthermore, in mature industries with established tech-
nologies, industrial agglomeration does not have a strong benecial spillover
e¤ect. Indeed, Henderson (2003) nds no signicant impact of agglomera-
tion on rm productivity in mature industries. In summary, it is expected
that the relative importance of the competition e¤ect over the spillover e¤ect
will be more prominent in mature industries than in fast-growing industries.
In other words, the net impact of agglomeration on rm markup should be
more negative in mature industries, but less negative or even insignicant in
fast-growing industries.
To divide industries into mature industries and fast-growing industries,
we follow the classication of Henderson et al. (1995). Specically, mature
industries are dened as those that experience no growth at all during our
sample period, and fast-growing industries are dened as those that experi-
ence 100% employment growth during the sample period.12 We also experi-
ment with an alternative classication of mature industries (i.e., those with
growth rates <  20% ) and fast-growing industries (i.e., those with growth
rates > 150%). Regression results for the subsamples of fast-growing and
mature industries are shown in Columns 3-6 of Table 4. Consistent with the
above argument, the impact of agglomeration on rm markup turns out to
be insignicant for fast-growing industries, whereas the negative impact of
agglomeration on rm markup is negative and statistically signicant for the
mature industries.
Homogenous versus di¤erentiated industries. The devastating
competition e¤ect brought by industrial agglomeration largely stems from
the enhanced opportunity for consumers to search for the lowest prices. If the
prices of the relevant goods are publicly available, industrial agglomeration
12See Table A2 for a list of the fast-growing and mature industries.
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does not bring any extra localized competition. As long as there is some ben-
ecial spillover e¤ect from agglomeration, the net impact of agglomeration
on markup should be less negative or even positive for industries/goods for
which the price information is publicly available. Following the classication
of Rauch (1999), we divide industries into three categories in declining order
of the degree of public informativeness of prices: those with goods traded at
exchanges (denoted as Homogenous), those with goods for which there are
some reference prices (denoted as Reference), and the remaining industries
(denoted as Di¤erentiated). Regression results are reported in Columns 7-
9 of Table 4. Consistent with the above argument, we nd a positive and
signicant e¤ect of agglomeration on rm markup in industries with goods
traded at exchanges, but signicant and negative e¤ects in industries with
reference prices and the remaining industries.
6 Conclusion
The study of the geographic distribution of economic activities across coun-
tries and regions dates back at least to the days of Alfred Marshall (see Book
4, Chapter 10 of Principles of Economics (1890)). An intriguing phenomenon
uncovered by research in this area is the geographic clustering of rms con-
centrating on the provision of certain goods or services. Subsequent research
has focused on the benets of agglomeration, which are related to decreases
in the costs of production due to the positive spillover e¤ect. However, com-
parably much less attention has been paid to the costs of agglomeration.
While acknowledging the importance of some of the indirect costs of agglom-
eration (such as congestion) discussed in the literature, we believe a much
neglected, direct cost of agglomeration is enhanced competition brought out
by agglomeration. To fully understand the geographic distribution of eco-
nomic activities, it is imperative to examine the costs as well as benets of
agglomeration.
Given that the negative competition e¤ect of agglomeration lowers prices,
whereas the positive spillover e¤ect lowers the marginal production costs, in
this paper, we use rm markup (dened as the ratio of price over marginal
cost) as a simple and comprehensive measure to capture the net impact of ag-
glomeration. Following a methodology recently developed by De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012), we rst estimate the markup ratio for each rm from the
data set of Chinese manufacturing rms in the 1998-2005 period. To identify
the causal impact of agglomeration on rm markup, we use a scenario in
which some rms change their industrial a¢ liations as a quasi-experiment.
Our DID estimation shows that the overall impact of agglomeration on rm
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markup is negative, suggesting the dominance of the negative competition
e¤ect over the positive spillover e¤ect in the Chinese context. Our results
are robust to various sensitivity checks on the satisfaction of our DID identi-
cation assumption and other estimation issues. Furthermore, we nd that
the impacts of agglomeration on rm markup vary across di¤erent industries
and types of rms, as the relative strength of the negative competitive e¤ect
versus the positive spillover e¤ect varies under di¤erent circumstances.
Our research highlights the importance of examining the costs as well
as the benets of agglomeration. It contributes to the economic geography
literature by demonstrating the use of markup ratio as a measure of the net
impact of agglomeration. Our ndings on the negative impact of agglomer-
ation on markup, based on data from Chinas manufacturing rms, suggest
there are limits to agglomeration, as rms need to balance the lower pro-
duction costs a¤orded by agglomeration against the lower prices caused by
enhanced competition. Furthermore, our ndings call for more studies on the
net impact of agglomeration using data from other countries and regions.
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Appendix A: Estimation of the Production Func-
tion
We re-write the production function (1) in the translog form
qit = llit + kkit + mmit + !it + "it; (22)
where the lower case letters represent the logarithm of the upper case letters;
= (l; k; m) is the vector of the production function coe¢ cients; and "it is
an i.i.d. error term. To proxy !it, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assume that
mit = mt (lit; kit; !it) : (23)
Given the monotonicity of mt (:), we can have
!it = ht (lit; kit;mit) : (24)
In the rst stage, we estimate the following equation
qit = t (lit; kit; !it) + "it; (25)
where
it = llit + kkit + mmit + ht (lit; kit;mit) ; (26)
and obtain the estimates of the expected output (^it) and the error term
("^it).
Meanwhile, to recover all the production function coe¢ cients  in the
second stage, we model that rm productivity follows a rst-order Markov
movement, i.e.,
!it = gt (!it 1) + it; (27)
where it is an idiosyncratic shock.
From the rst stage, the productivity for any given value of  can be
computed as
!it () = ^it   (llit + kkit + mmit) : (28)
Then the idiosyncratic shock to productivity given , it (), can be obtained
through a nonparametric regression of !it () on !it 1 ().
To identify the coe¢ cients of the production function, Ackerberg, Caves,
and Frazier (2006) assume that capital is determined one period beforehand
26
and hence is not correlated with it (). In addition, wage rates and prices of
intermediate materials are assumed to vary across rms and be serially cor-
related. Therefore, the moment conditions used to estimate the coe¢ cients
of the production function are
E
0@it ()
0@ lit 1kit
mit 1
1A1A = 0: (29)
Appendix B: Incorporating the Role of Ag-
glomeration into the Estimation of the Pro-
duction Function
Agglomeration has been found to positively a¤ect rm productivity, which
may raise the concern that it could then potentially a¤ect the production
function. To address this concern, we explicitly incorporate the role of ag-
glomeration into the estimation procedure of the production function. Specif-
ically, rm productivity is assumed to follow the following Markov movement
!it = gt (!it 1; agglomerationjt 1) + it; (30)
where agglomerationjt 1 is the degree of agglomeration in industry j (for
which rm i belongs to) at time t  1. Other procedures are similar to those
in Appendix A.
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 Figure 1:  Industry agglomeration and firm markup (EG index measured at two-digit SIC industry and city level) 
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Table1: Markup ratios and EG indices for two-digit manufacturing industries 
 
  
EG index 
Industry Markup  Province City County 
Food Processing  1.19  0.061 0.017 0.006 
Food Production 1.27  0.016 0.000 -0.004 
Beverage Production 1.41  0.013 -0.009 -0.013 
Tobacco Processing 1.54  0.032 -0.022 -0.025 
Textiles 1.21  0.048 0.013 0.005 
Garments & Other Fiber Products 1.16  0.035 0.010 0.005 
Leather, Furs, Down & Related Products 1.17  0.081 0.024 0.008 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane,  
  Palm Fiber & Straw Products 1.22 
 0.030 0.013 0.004 
Furniture Manufacturing 1.23  0.036 0.005 0.003 
Papermaking & Paper Products 1.23  0.018 0.002 -0.001 
Printing & Reproduction of Recording Media 1.28  0.010 0.003 0.000 
Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 1.17  0.139 0.032 0.017 
Petroleum Processing, Coking Products,  
  Gas Production & Supply 1.35 
 0.127 0.013 0.001 
Chemical Raw Materials & Chemical Products 1.37  0.015 -0.001 -0.004 
Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 1.47  0.016 0.003 -0.002 
Chemical Fibers Manufacturing 1.18  0.028 0.004 -0.003 
Rubber Products 1.31  0.004 -0.006 -0.011 
Plastic Products 1.18  0.054 0.015 0.007 
Non-metal Mineral Products 1.26  0.027 0.011 0.003 
Ferrous Metal Smelting & Rolling Processing 1.21  0.059 0.009 0.002 
Non-ferrous Metal Smelting & Rolling Processing 1.32  0.043 0.017 0.009 
Metal Products 1.31  0.028 0.005 0.001 
General Machinery Manufacturing 1.22  0.022 0.003 0.000 
Special Equipment Manufacturing 1.33  0.021 0.002 -0.002 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 1.25  0.029 0.011 -0.004 
Electric Equipment & Machinery 1.25  0.029 0.007 0.004 
Electronics & Telecommunications 1.24  0.083 0.020 0.003 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural & Official Machinery 1.39  0.039 0.005 -0.005 
Other Manufacturing 1.20  0.043 0.016 0.005 
Note: Firm-level markup ratios are estimated using De Loecker and Warzynski (2011)’s method. Weighted (output) 
average markup is calculated for each two-digit industry in 1998-2005. Agglomeration is calculated using EG index 
(Ellison and Glaeser, 1997) at three geographic scopes (province, city, and county).  
  
 
 
Table 2: Main results 
 
 
Whole period 
effect  
Pre-treatment 
terms included  
Firm-time 
trends  More controls  Placebo test  
  1  2  3  4  5  
Treatment*Post 0.000  -0.002  0.001  0.001  0.000  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
EG*Post -0.092***  -0.093***  -0.049**  -0.115***  0.000  
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.001)  
F test (treatment*Pre(-1), treatment*Pre(-2))   [1.51]        
           
Firm size (output)       -0.080***    
       (0.001)    
Firm age       0.000    
       (0.000)    
Firm productivity        0.046***    
       (0.002)    
Foreign ownership       0.002    
       (0.002)    
Export status       0.000    
       (0.001)    
Firm dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm time trend No  No  Yes  No  No  
Obs. # 214138  214138  214138  214138  214138  
Note: Standard errors, clustered at firm level, are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
  
Table 3: Robustness checks 
 
EG at 
province 
level  
EG at 
county 
level  
One-shot 
effect  
Excl. 
markup 
outliers  
Change across 
two-digit 
industry 
 Allow for 
omitted 
prices bias 
 
Role of 
agglomeration 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Treatment*Post 0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.006***  0.006*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
EG*Post -0.030***  -0.057***  -0.194***  -0.072***  -0.140***  -0.151***  -0.042** 
 (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.019) 
              
Firm dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. # 214138  214138  142900  210103  132284  214138  214138 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at firm level, are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
Table 4: Heterogeneous responses 
  Ownership  Industry growth rate   Product price informativeness 
  SOEs 
Non-
SOEs  >100% >150% <0% <-20%  Homogeneous Reference Differentiated 
 1 2  3 4 5 6  7 8 9 
Treatment*post -0.005 0.001  -0.025*** 0.014*** -0.006*** 0.009***  -0.010*** 0.004** 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
EG*post 0.018 -0.101***  -0.043 -0.081 -0.086*** -0.073***  0.233*** -0.097** -0.100*** 
 (0.077) (0.018)  (0.072) (0.095) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.077) (0.038) (0.020) 
            
Firm dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. # 21701 192437  26643 11810 71991 36323  11777 52761 149600 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at firm level, are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
  
Table A1: Impact of agglomeration on firm productivity  
 
Whole 
period effect  
Pre-treatment 
terms 
included 
 
One-shot 
effect  
Firm-time 
trends 
included 
 
Additional 
controls 
 Allow for 
omitted 
price bias 
 
Role of 
agglomeration  
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Treatment*Post 0.006  0.019***  0.007*  0.006  0.004  -0.018***  -0.022***  
 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
EG*Post 0.360***  0.364***  0.596***  0.218**  0.373***  0.605***  0.283***  
 
(0.085)  (0.085)  (0.112)  (0.099)  (0.082)  (0.094)  (0.103)  
F test (treatment*Pre(-1), 
treatment*Pre(-2))   [0.09]       
    
Firm size (output)         0.180***     
 
        (0.005)      
Firm age         -0.001***      
 
        (0.000)      
Foreign ownership         -0.004      
 
        (0.012)      
Export status         -0.001      
 
        (0.004)      
              
 
Firm dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm time trend No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  
Obs. # 236630  236630  157079  236630  236630  236630  236630  
Note: Standard errors, clustered at firm level, are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
  
Table A2: Typical fast-growing and mature industries in China 
Fast-growing industries (three-digit SIC code) Mature industries (two-digit SIC code) 
Apparel Manufacturing (181) Food Processing (13) 
Leather Shoes, Apparel, Luggage & Handbags, and Bags Manufacturing (192) Food Production (14) 
Plywood, Fiberboard, Chipboard, and Other Artificial Boards Manufacturing (202) Beverage Production (15) 
Wood Furniture Manufacturing (211) Tobacco Processing (16) 
Metal Furniture Manufacturing (213) Textiles (17) 
Sporting and Athletic Goods Manufacturing (242) Papermaking and Paper Products (22) 
Toys manufacturing (244) Printing and Reproduction of Recording Media (23) 
Coking (257) Chemical Raw Materials and Chemical Products (26) 
Biological Products (275) Chemical Fibers Manufacturing (28) 
Household Plastic Goods Manufacturing (307) Rubber products (29) 
Plastic Parts Manufacturing (308) Non-metal Mineral Products (31) 
Metal Fabric Manufacturing (341) Ferrous Metal Smelting & Rolling Processing (32) 
Electricity Transmission, Distribution and Control Equipment Manufacturing (404)  Non-ferrous Metal Smelting & Rolling Processing (33) 
Computers Manufacturing (414) General Machinery Manufacturing (35) 
Vacuum Tubes, Semi-conductor Devices, and Integrated Circuits Manufacturing (415) Special Equipment Manufacturing (36) 
Electronic Components Manufacturing (416) Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (37) 
Mirrors, Eye Glasses, Umbrellas, Bristle Processing and Brush Manufacturing (435)  
Note: We define fast-growing industries as those whose total employment growth rate in the 1998-2005 period is above 100%, mature industries as those whose total employment 
growth rate in the 1998-2005 period is below 0%. 
 
